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2ABSTRACT (Words 150)
This study aimed to investigate why there is variability in taking blood.
A multi method Pilot study was completed in four National Health Service
Scotland hospitals. Human Factors/Ergonomics principles were applied to
analyse data from 50 observations, 15 interviews and 12-months of incident
data from all Scottish hospitals. The Functional Resonance Analysis Method
(FRAM) was used to understand why variability may influence blood sampling
functions.
The analysis of the 61 pre blood transfusion sampling incidents highlighted
limitations in the data collected to understand factors influencing performance.
FRAM highlighted how variability in the sequence of blood sampling functions
and the number of practitioners involved in a single blood sampling activity was
influenced by the working environment, equipment, clinical context, work
demands and staff resources.
This pilot study proposes a realistic view of why blood sampling activities vary
and proposes the need to consider the system’s resilience in future safety
management strategies.
Key Words: Blood sampling, Wrong Blood In Tube, Resilience
3Word count 4153
INTRODUCTION
In acute hospital care, the hazard of testing the wrong patient’s blood, due to
inaccuracies in sample labelling or patient identification creates a risk of
inefficient patient care, patient harm and even death. A wrong blood in tube
(WBIT) incident will influence the likelihood that a patient efficiently and safely
receives the required intervention e.g. the transfusion of the correct blood
component [1]. International evidence cited for WBIT incidents is between 1 in
every 1,500 – 3,000 of blood samples taken [2,3]. In the United Kingdom (UK),
the Serious Hazards of Transfusion (SHOT) organisation is an independent
haemovigilance scheme providing an annual comprehensive analysis and
summary of national data associated with transfusion incidents. Currently data
suggests few cases of major morbidity or death from WBITs, however, the
potential for harm remains as the WBIT rate continues to rise [1]. In 2012 the
British Committee for Standards in Haematology [4] requested that unless a
secure electronic identification system was in place a second sample of the
patient’s blood should be requested prior to the transfusion of blood
components. This recommendation is intended to mitigate the risk of harm to
patients through WBIT incidents, however, it does not address why WBITs occur
and hence they are likely to continue.
From a safety science perspective the most obvious questions to ask are how
and why does blood sampling go wrong? There is, however, an alternative
question: how and why does blood sampling usually go right? In 2014 the
National Health Service (NHS) in Scotland completed 495,094 samples; for
every 1 WBIT, 7583 samples were successfully processed and reported (Scottish
National Blood Transfusion Service 2015). Lawton et al (2015) [5] suggests
healthcare is being encouraged, like other safety industries [6], to shift safety
management strategies away from solely focusing on error detection and
incident management (Safety-I approach) [6,7]. Instead a Safety-II strategy is
proposed as a more proactive approach to understand safety and increase the
focus on safety interventions to ensure more things go right more often, which
complements a Safety-I approach [8]. The underlying assumption of Safety-II is
4that in complex socio-technical systems adjustments to everyday working
environments and human performance are normal, and are relied upon to
accommodate uncertainty, fluctuations in demand and organisational
constraints. Understanding these adjustments and the trade-offs made by the
healthcare workforce provides a realistic view of how an organisation functions
and how everyday work is usually done.
Published literature suggests two core issues impact on blood sampling system
safety and reliability: patient identification and sample labelling. Formal
identification of a patient underpins safety in many healthcare interventions;
however, it may not always occur [9, 10, 11]. Mis-labelling of blood samples is a
risk which may harm the patient or delay treatment [12, 13, 14]. Evidence
reports these events but with the exception of one recent study [15] does not
look to understand why. In addition incident reporting systems presents a biased
interpretation of data, as reporting does not seek to capture the breadth of
system related factors which influence human performance and are not
representative of all types of incidents that happen [1, 16, 17, 18, 19].
The aim of this pilot study is to understand why variability in blood sampling
performance in acute hospital settings can occur. The methods applied were
informed by Human Factors science, to understand why performance might vary
and how a Safety-II approach can inform future safety management
programmes.
METHOD
A three-month study at four acute medium – large hospitals in NHS Scotland
was completed in 2015 involving three clinical areas which reflect those with the
highest proportion of WBIT incidents [1]: Emergency departments, outpatients,
and acute wards.
This study introduced the Functional Resonance Analysis Method (FRAM), an
approach specifically developed to model complex systems [20]. FRAM offers a
systematic approach to describing and examining work as it is done rather than
imagined and reflects interactions between functions and their potential
variability.
5Data collection and Analysis
The methods used to inform FRAM included observations (n=50) and semi
structured interviews (n=15), see Table 1. These were supported by two
workshops with Transfusion Practitioners to develop and verify the findings and
produce the FRAM model. The methods were completed by two researchers (LP
& SA). The approach to sampling was pragmatic and convenience sampling was
necessary based on staffing levels and availability. A limited number of
observations with medical doctors was possible and this informed the sampling
process for the interviews completed, which recruited a greater percentage of
medical staff. One year of pre blood transfusion sampling incident data (n=61),
from 14 regional health boards (authorities) within Scotland (n= 15), were also
anonymised and analysed.
Table 1 Data collection details
Observations
Emergency
Department
Acute Wards Obstetrics Outpatients
n=12 n=10 n=5 n=23
Doctor Healthcare
Support Worker
Nurse Phlebotomist
n=2 n=14 n=21 n=13
Interviews
Doctor Healthcare
Support Worker
Nurse Phlebotomist
6 1 6 2
Total time = 484 minutes
Average time = 40 minutes 30 seconds
Range in time = 26 – 58 minutes
Observation Data
Observations were completed by two of researchers (LP & SA). Fifty observations
were completed (Doctors n= 2, Healthcare Support Workers n=14, nurses n=
21, Phlebotomists n= 13) using a standardised observation tool developed
specifically for the study (see online supplementary appendix A). Permission was
gained from patients. A Human Factors systems model, the Systems Engineering
Initiative for Patient Safety (SEIPS) model [21], was used to code observations
and identify factors influencing blood sampling activities, a sample of data was
double coded by two investigators (LP & SA) to verify and modify the coding
strategy.
6Semi structured interviews
Interview questions (see online supplementary appendix B) were developed
following a review of the literature, they were tailored to the time available, and
recorded and transcribed with permission. The analysis of the interview data
informed FRAM and had two aims [20]: firstly to identify the core functions
relevant to describe blood sampling activities. This was completed independently
by three of the authors (LP, SA & EH) and compared to obtain a consensus.
Secondly the core functions became codes used to thematically analyse the data
for sources of variability specific to each function.
Incident data analysis
Descriptive statistics were completed of the incident data and a content analysis
using thematic coding [22], was completed by one investigator (LP). Level one
codes represented the outcome of the incident. Level two codes were based on
the SEIPS model [21]. As a pilot study the opportunity was taken to explore if
this form of incident data analysis was practical and contributed to informing
FRAM. This form of analysis is not essential to FRAM and project resources only
allowed for one researcher to be allocated to this task.
7Functional Resonance Analysis Method (FRAM)
FRAM applied the findings from analysis of interview and observational data to
describe the functions relevant to the entire blood sampling process. Each
function was described using up to six aspects (Box 1); the ‘output’ from one
function was linked as a necessary ‘input’ or ‘precondition’ for a subsequent
function. A FRAM model was created within a workshop with Transfusion
Practitioners using a software tool (http://functionalresonance.com/tools-
visualisation/index.html). This explored how the functions interact and which key
interactions and sources of variability will potentially influence a functions
‘output’ –either with regard to its timing or quality.
Time
Time influencing or
constraining how the
function is completed
Control
Artefacts or other
functions which
determines or
regulates how the
function is completed
e.g. procedures,
guidelines
Output
The result of the
function and links to
functions downstream
Resources
That consumed or
required to complete a
function e.g.
manpower,
competence, software
Precondition
System conditions
that must be fulfilled
before a function can
be commenced
Input
That which activates
the function or is used
or transformed to
produce the output.
This is the link to
upstream functions.
Box 1 FRAM descriptors and a sample of functions which represent the blood
sampling process
8Analysis of the FRAM model focused on understanding which core functions
contribute to the success of multiple subsequent functions, and combinations of
closely dependent functions. The FRAM model provided a visual representation
that challenged how the clinical teams believed the blood sampling procedures
were applied to the reality. This verified that the final FRAM model represented
what does, or potentially could, happen when blood sampling is completed
rather than perceived to happen as reflected in protocols and guidance.
FINDINGS
Incident Data Analysis
Job roles associated with WBIT incidents
Descriptive statistics of the incident data supported evidence [1] on the
prevalence of WBIT incidents being greater for Doctors (42%) than Nurses
(23%), Midwifes (23%) and Phlebotomists (3%). However, without the
frequency with which each job role takes the relative risk for each professional
group can't be calculated.
The data suggests the majority of incidents occurred during normal working
hours with peaks at around 12.00, and 15.00-16.00 hours, Figure 1. This may
well reflect when the majority of samples are taken or be linked to other factors
which may contribute to fatigue [23].
WBIT outcomes and influencing factors
Table 2 summarises the percentage split of the codes attributed to the outcome
and factors influencing the incident based on the SEIPS model.
9Figure 1 Time of day of WBIT incidents.
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Table 2 Systems Engineering Initiative for Patient Safety (SEIPS) Model and Incident Data Codes
SEIPS
Components
Selection of Element
Examples Wrong Label Wrong Patient
Wrong Patient
Information
Person Education, skills and
knowledge, motivation,
needs, physical
characteristics,
9% 32% 25%
Fatigue, compassion for
patient
Alertness, fatigue Fatigue, fake
patient identity
Organisation Team work, communication,
organisational culture and
patient safety culture, work
schedules, social
relationships, supervisory
and management style
13% 5% 25%
Procedure practicality,
training, team
communication, staff
rotation, staff resources
Procedures –
practicality, team
work
Work schedule
Technologies
and tools
Various information
technologies: electronic
health record, medical
devices. Other technologies
and tools, human factors
characteristics e.g. usability
16% 5% 13%
Unavailability, usability Usability Usability
Tasks Variety of tasks, job
content, challenge and
utilisation of skills,
autonomy, job control and
participation, job demands
(e.g. workload, time
pressure, cognitive load,
need for attention)
51% 53% 25%
Job demands, time
pressure, distractions,
interruptions, multi-
tasking, similar
information, information
presentation, task
sequence and timing
Job demands,
distractions,
workload, similar
information, need
for attention, multi-
tasking
Need for attention
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Environment Layout, noise, lighting,
temperature, humidity and
air quality, workstation
design.
9% 5% 13%
Noise - distractions Noise - distractions Noise - distractions
Care
processes
and other
processes
Care processes, other
processes: information flow,
purchasing, maintenance,
cleaning, process
improvement activities
2% 0% 0%
Equipment maintenance
and repair
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The data revealed that the greatest number of incidents were associated with an
outcome of the ‘wrong label’, these were more frequently associated with the
‘task’ code. This highlighted the challenge posed in the labelling of samples
created from checking similar information, multi-tasking and time pressure.
Additional contributory factors were: usability of interfaces to select the correct
patient from a drop down list, the presence of different patient labels in the
same proximity, unavailability of technical systems, practicality of procedures
and staffing levels.
FRAM analysis
A FRAM model was produced including 31 functions representative of blood
sampling activity. The number of interactions between functions, upstream or
downstream dependencies, are presented in Table 3 columns 2 and 3. The
model was used to present two instantiations for blood sampling as observed in
outpatients and reported on in an emergency situation. Variability typical to
completing the core functions within these two instantiations were elicited from
the data, Table 3. Interactions and dependencies between functions highlight
potential differences in the sequence of functions (Table 3) and how different
practitioners complete clusters of functions (see online supplementary appendix
C, each colour illustrates a different practitioner). One blood sample in the
Outpatients clinic setting typically involved four practitioners and in an acute
emergency situation potentially three or more.
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Table 3 Summary of function outputs and variability in blood sampling functions
Function Up-
stream
Influence
Down-
stream
Influence
Function Output Variability of Output
In Outpatients*
O
ut
pa
tie
nt
s
se
qu
en
ce
**
Em
er
ge
nc
y
se
qu
en
ce
**
Variability of Output
In Emergency*
Maintenance
support
0 4 IT systems available
Collect relevant
information 3 5
Clinical information
Priority of sample
Patient identity
On time – completed prior clinic
Acceptable – consultation with
patient provides information
2 Omitted – patient identity unknown
Produce and
attach patient
wristband
0 3 Wristband
Decide to take a
blood sample 0 6
Decision to take blood
Required samples
On time – completed prior to
clinic. Acceptable – accepted as
appropriate from referring
Doctor
1 2
On time – often one of the first
interventions. Acceptable –
immediate activity required to
determine interventions
Assign
appropriate staff 0 4 Competent staff
Schedule work
(sampling) 4 3
Sample collection
time
Sampling sequence
*These columns illustrate how the timing or accuracy of relevant resources and information may impede, and/or require staff to adjust the sequence or
performance of the blood sampling functions. The reliability and sequence of the request and labelling of blood sample functions is determined by the clinical
context and availability of technical resources.
**These columns illustrate the order in which the functions were typically observed during the study. This illustrates variability exists in the sequence of blood
sampling functions between clinical contexts to obtain a sample.
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Function Up-
stream
Influence
Down-
stream
Influence
Function Output Variability of Output
In Outpatients
O
ut
pa
tie
nt
s
se
qu
en
ce
Em
er
ge
nc
y
se
qu
en
ce Variability of Output
In Emergency
Maintain
adequate stock
levels of
equipment
0 4
Request forms
Equipment available
Labels, In date tubes
Complete
request process 3 5
Written request form
IT system request
Documentation of
required samples
On time – completed prior to
clinic. Acceptable – as patient
presents on clinic list requiring
bloods
3 6
Imprecise – inaccuracy of
completion or selection of details.
Too late – delayed request for
temporary identifier
Print labels and
collect 4 4
Labels
Printed labels
Printed IT system
form
On time –printed local to clinic
prior to patient arrival. Precise –
paper clipped to patient case
notes used to check identity
4 7
Too late – labels may be printed
after blood sampling
Imprecise – wrong labels printed or
collected
Check the form /
requests 2 4
Documentation of
required samples
Patient identity
On time – without check unaware
of patient identity requiring
sample
5 8 Too late – unavailable prior to
sample taken
Gather blood
sampling
equipment
3 2 Blood sampling
equipment
On time – prepared prior to clinic
starting
7 3 Too late – interrupts or delays thesampling process if equipment is
unavailable
Label tube 2 1 Labelled tube
Prepare oneself
for taking a
sample
4 2 Preparationscompleted
Clean hands, gloves
On time – sink and equipment
available and accepted norm
within team
10
Omitted –may not be completed -
time pressure, patient or clinician
characteristics
Perform
venepuncture 5 1 Access to vein
On time – as the resource of
blood sampling knowledge is
likely to be high in this context
11 4 On time – as the resource of bloodsampling knowledge is likely to be
high in this context
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Function Up-
stream
Influence
Down-
stream
Influence
Function Output Variability of Output
In Outpatients
O
ut
pa
tie
nt
s
se
qu
en
ce
Em
er
ge
nc
y
se
qu
en
ce Variability of Output
In Emergency
Locate intended
patient 4 1 Location of patient
Acceptable – called from waiting
room 6 1 Acceptable
Check identity of
patient 4 3 Correctly identifiedpatient
Imprecise – unreliable checking
wrong patient
Not at all – familiarity inhibits
checking. Distraction/interruption
8
Communicate to
establish identity 0 3
Patient conformance
Relative conformance
Inform patient
and consent 2 1
Permission to take
blood sample
Not at all – assumed consent,
familiarity with patient 9
Label blood
sample 7 4
Labelled sample Imprecise – incorrect minimal ID
data set attached to sample 13 9
Imprecise – incorrect minimal
ID data set attached to sample
Take blood
samples 4 1
Blood sample taken On time - as the resource of
blood sampling knowledge is
likely to be high in this context
12 5 On time - as the resource ofblood sampling knowledge is
likely to be high in this context
Cross check
patient ID to
request
4 3 Correctly identifiedpatient
Samples required
Not at all – check of patient ID
omitted unintended patient
Imprecise - unreliable checking
unintended patient
Bag samples 2 1 Bagged samples 15 11
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Function
Up-
stream
Influence
Down-
stream
Influence
Function Output Variability of Output
In Outpatients
O
ut
pa
tie
nt
s
se
qu
en
ce
Em
er
ge
nc
y
se
qu
en
ce Variability of Output
In Emergency
Cross check
intended patient
ID on blood
sample
3 1 Cross checkcompleted
Record samples
completed 3 0
Documentation Acceptable – record of samples
completed 14 10
Send samples to
lab 5 1
Sample received
Not at all – pod system
malfunctions and may prevent
samples reaching correct
destination
16 12
Omitted – pod system
malfunctions and may prevent
samples reaching correct
destination
17
Practitioner Resources
The function ‘Assign appropriate staff’ will influence the ratio between the
demand for blood samples and the ability for a healthcare system to respond.
Practitioners suggested this function may compromise later checking functions.
“I like to double check and make sure I have got the right person…. in this
situation that you are totally busy that kind of double checking process
can sometimes go out the window”
Time pressure contributes to workload, and is a stressor which can negatively
impact individual performance in tasks that rely upon attention to ensure
accuracy [24]. Unpredictability in workload and availability of a venepuncturist
can create real and perceived time pressures.
Context of Blood Sampling
The number of practitioners involved to complete a single blood sample varied.
Instantiations (scenarios) using the FRAM model illustrated two clinical contexts.
In an emergency, several practitioners may attempt to take blood, the sample
might be passed to another practitioner to initiate the request process and label
the bloods. Further complications or delays occur for an unidentified patient.
Without the minimum patient core identifiers, practitioners are unable to access
technical systems and request investigations. To enable the sample to be
processed a temporary identification number is created. However, once the
identity of the patient is established unique identifiers e.g. CHI or NHS numbers
will be used and at some stage the patient may have two numbers.
In the first instantiation the urgency of the context justifies distributing functions
within the team to allow those with clinical expertise to remain with the patient.
In outpatients the demand for blood samples, time constraints and physical work
environment influenced why practitioners distributed the functions.
Both strategies aimed to positively influence the system’s efficiency where time
was limited for different reasons. In outpatients the working practices also aimed
to reduce the risks associated with checking a patient’s information in a
challenging working environment; where multiple practitioners work with several
patients in the same workspace with distractions and interruptions. The absence
of wristbands in this setting combined with time pressures and familiarity with
patients, highlighted why variability in identify checks may occur.
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“I think sometimes you see so many patients you just forget (to check). Not
intentionally, sometimes you think I know this patient. ”
Information
Three functions: ‘Decide to take blood sample’, ‘Collect relevant information’ and
‘Complete request process’ influenced the greatest number of other functions
within the model. The expertise of the practitioner is instrumental to the decision
and demand for blood samples. Increased demands were predicted as expertise
fluctuates e.g. during the rotation of foundation year medical staff.
Accessibility of information was also influential to the reliability and variability
associated with decision making. The usability of information sources was
suggested as influential to the efficiency and accuracy with which patient details
are recorded and the patient is correctly identified.
Collecting information to complete requests may be pulled from several sources.
The lack of accessibility, usability and standardisation between clinical settings,
were reported as influential to the accuracy and efficiency in which information
can be collected.
“I have just come back from working in hospital X and each of the group
and save forms is different and I think that can sometimes causes bits of
it not to be filled out well”
This potential for variability in collecting patient information introduces a greater
dependency upon later checking to ensure a success. However, observations
suggested familiarity with patients may impede this check.
Labelling Blood Samples
‘Labelling the blood sample’ is influenced by seven functions with the potential
for variability in timing or accuracy. The dependency upon a high number of
functions creates vulnerability. The quality of labelling determines efficiency and
safety in management of blood samples. Hand written labels are required for
samples completed prior to a blood transfusion. Incorrectly labelled samples
risks a patient receiving incompatible blood components or delaying
transfusions. Writing neatly on a sample bottle with a non matt, curved surface,
whilst ensuring all text remains inside boxes approximately 2mm high was
considered a challenge. This combined with contextual factors such as time
19
pressure, competing work requests and distractions were all cited as influential
to variability in performance.
Printing blood sample labels is acceptable for the majority of blood tests. This
requires access to technical systems, without which practitioners need to adjust
the sequence of blood sampling functions. Unavailability of these systems were
reported due to: system maintenance, insufficient numbers in proportion to staff
working within an area, equipment failure and delayed repairs. Practitioners
implied the unavailability of technology should not delay obtaining a blood
sample; delays may consequently impede the transition of a patient, access to
treatment or discharge from hospital. Subsequently, requests and labels may be
gathered after a sample is obtained. This suggests the details on the requests
and labels may not be used to inform the remaining functions associated with
‘checking identity of patient’.
DISCUSSION
This pilot study sought to understand why variability in blood sampling
performance in acute hospital settings can occur. The findings provide insights
into why practitioners modify their work practices to manage the context and
environments where blood sampling is required.
Healthcare seeks to identify a ‘cause’ for an accident or incident [5], with the
practitioner often suggested as the more unpredictable component of the
system.
This pilot study has highlighted why variability in practice is likely and is in fact
the norm, with the potential for both positive and negative outcomes for patient
safety and accommodating organisational demands.
An organisation or complex system is a dynamic entity which operates within a
safety envelope. Gradually everyday work practices or adjustments are made to
accommodate organisational priorities which will impact the decisions made daily
by practitioners. The emergence of strategies can introduce ‘drift’ in the way
work is done [25]. The term ‘Resilience’ or ‘Resilience engineering’ refers to how
well a system is designed to recognise and respond to such shifts within an
organisation and the impact on how a system functions. A resilient system would
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be capable of identifying and adapting to potential vulnerabilities or threats to
safety without the need for an incident or accident to occur [26].
The concept of system resilience is a developing approach which informs a
Safety-II approach for healthcare to consider as an alternative to improve the
quality and safety of their systems by ensuring more things can go right [8,27].
This assumes variability in human performance is normal but aims to promote
positive performance variability whilst dampening the negative.
FRAM has provided a realistic model of blood sampling to understand why
variability occurs and how the system succeeds through adaptability of
practitioners and where system resilience can be improved. Four key themes are
proposed for further consideration to enhance the quality, safety and efficiency
of blood sampling activities: design, reliability, resources and reporting.
Design
Equipment and technology relied upon within environments such as healthcare
should be informed by the principles of good design [28]. These require
consideration to the context, task and users to inform on a design which can
promote usability, safety and efficiency [29]. The FRAM analysis highlighted how
the function of ‘collect relevant information’ is influential to the accuracy of
several other core functions. The checking of the identity of the patient is a
function intended to defend against errors associated with these functions and
the majority of safety interventions focus upon practitioner behaviour when
labelling and checking. Evidence relating to improvement strategies for blood
sampling activities highlights that several interventions in combination can have
an impact upon reducing WBIT incidents, however, these are rarely maintained
and a fresh look at the problem has been called for [1, 2].
There appeared little evidence relevant to the physical design, presentation and
quality of the equipment and interface design influencing collecting the correct
information. Hand writing blood sample labels on a curved and small writing
surface requires physical dexterity. Combined with wearing gloves and high
levels of distractions highlights how well practitioners do to succeed.
Job design should also be explored further to understand why a difference
between job roles and WBIT prevalence exists. The characteristics of work
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activities and control of the timing of these activities may differ between job
roles predisposing some job roles to performance influencing factors more likely
to influence blood sampling activities.
Designing to make it easier to do the right thing as often as possible is at the
heart of Human Factors. This would seem relevant to the design of software
interfaces, request forms and blood sample bottles, which need to consider when
and where blood sampling occurs and associated system hazards (e.g. time
pressure, conflicting work demands), to evaluate the usability of any design and
ensure risks are As Low as Reasonably Practicable (ALARP)[30].
Standardising through design can influence variability in performance.
Practitioners are regularly required to rotate around hospitals or move between
departments. Standardisation of the design of the artefacts that support patient
safety relevant activities common to any healthcare setting could reduce
variability in the format that information is presented.
Reliability
Healthcare’s reliance upon technology to complete core activities will continue to
increase. The instantiations captured within the FRAM model highlighted the
significance of the reliability and availability of technical systems to the sequence
order and adjustments necessary to complete blood sampling within a required
time frame. Practitioners will delay, adjust the order or distribute functions
within a team to ensure blood sampling did not delay patient care. This flexibility
to adapt to technical failures was highlighted as frequent and necessary to
manage patient care and work demands within care settings studies.
The resilience in systems, with increased dependency upon technology, needs to
consider how to learn, monitor and respond to expected and unexpected failures
or maintenance. Proactive systems to understand the risks associated with
failure in technology, effective failure and maintenance reporting systems and
procurement of user tested systems could benefit healthcare as it has done in
high reliability industries [31]. This pilot study suggests organisational
effectiveness and practitioner behaviour will both be influenced by the reliability
of technology necessary to obtain relevant patient information, complete a
request and label a blood sample. The ability to anticipate and respond to any
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fragility in these systems would seem to be essential but as such does not
appear to be a priority.
Resources
The ratio of blood samples obtained compared to competent and confident
practitioners available to complete them influenced several outputs of the
functions.
The variability and potential mismatch between demand and resources was
reported as influencing the time pressure and work demands for practitioners.
Practitioners highlighted the need to balance patient safety when completing
functions with an efficiency to ensure optimal patient care and satisfy
organisational goals. An organisation may not be able to sustain an ideal ratio,
however, understanding how to predict and respond to sudden or sustained
mismatches may enhance resilience. Seasonal fluctuations associated with
increases in patient caseload and the rotation of junior practitioners were two
such examples reported as increasing the number of blood samples. A mismatch
in resources and demand may influence the individual’s cognitive performance
and compromise the ability to remain engaged with a task, alertness, short term
memory, attention and motivation levels [24,32,33,34]. The concept of leading
indicators, where key performance indicators are identified and monitored, are
used by other industries [31] to proactively identify factors predicted as likely to
influence performance. Leading indicators aim to build resilience into the system
with an ability to anticipate, monitor and respond in a planned way rather than
rely upon frontline staff to absorb variability in the system.
Monitoring, Reporting and feedback
Incident reports and near miss data cannot be interrogated to consider how
internal factors may influence variability in performance e.g. stress, fatigue,
nutritional levels. There was no evidence to suggest time on duty, time since last
break and factors associated with fatigue are recorded as standard practice in
the healthcare settings collecting incidence data [1]. The incident analysis
process will heavily influence the lessons gained by organisations to inform
future interventions or strategies to manage safety concerns identified [5].
Healthcare incident data is limited by seeking a single ‘cause’ or deviation from
expected practice with little consideration to underlying influences that
contribute to the outcome recorded [19]. The SEIPs model has informed the
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analysis of incident data in this pilot study. This has provided a broader systems
approach to factors recognised as influencing human performance and
potentially contributing to the outcome recorded. This avoids the assumption
that a single cause can always be identified and instead seeks to identify factors
within a healthcare system that did/could contribute to undesirable variability in
performance. The practicality of procedures for all work contexts may imply
that ‘noncompliance’ or adjustments to the procedure is normal to everyday
work practices. Furthermore, there is no process to capture positive reporting on
why and how the system succeeds or indicate the success rate of different job
roles in relation to the frequency of completing an activity. Proactive monitoring
of performance indicators and observations or reports on everyday work can
focus an organisation’s attention to how safety is really achieved and where
safety concerns may emerge. Timing of feedback to practitioners and how
practically actions can be achieved and evaluated by an organisation to ensure
an effective response addresses the contributory factors identified is
instrumental to a positive reporting culture and system resilience [13].
STRENGTHS AND LIMITATIONS
A number of study strengths were apparent. We adopted a holistic Human
Factors methodological perspective in trying to understand the full range of
system factors which may influence variability and performance. Similarly we
also applied the FRAM approach which is particularly suited to understanding
why things go well in complex socio-technical systems and to address the type
of safety problem at hand. The multi-professional make-up of the research team
also provided a broad range of Human Factors, safety science, clinical and
managerial experience and expertise.
A number of limitations were apparent. This was a pilot study and as such data
collection was limited by the time and number of participants recruited for
interviews and observations. The observations were focused on clinical
environments reflected by NHS Scotland and within the SHOT 2013 Annual
report as suggesting greater risk of WBIT [1]. Limitations in the verification of
the coding of incident data have already been highlighted and require further
investigation. SEIPs appears to offer codes relevant to the incident data analysed
here, however, future studies are required to consider its usability for the
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analysis of all healthcare incident data and the inter and intra reliability of this
approach.
It is questionable if any methodological approach can fully specify a work
process in a complex socio-technical system, so it is likely that system factors of
interest have yet to be captured. Given the small study scope and the focus on
NHS Scotland hospitals then we should treat the findings with caution in terms of
any wider generalisability, however they will still be of interest to the
international practitioner, policy and research communities.
CONCLUSION
This pilot study has proposed a realistic model of blood sampling activities and
why variability in performance exists. Practitioners may adjust their practice to
balance patient safety in the context of fluctuating demands and challenging
work environments and equipment.
Adopting a Human Factors approach and using the FRAM model has enabled the
team to better understand how work is really done and why variability exists in a
complex healthcare environment. The results of the study will be used to
consider where resilience within the system can be enhanced.
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